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Abstract 
This article discusses the philosophical and ideological nature of theory and examines the ways ideology becomes infused into social work 
theory and practice. The use of critical thought and specific evaluation criteria based on consistency with social work values are proposed. 
IN RECENT TIMES, SOCIAL W O R K and many of the 
helping professions have placed a heavy emphasis on 
practice that is based on scientifically derived theories 
and knowledge. The National Association of Social 
Workers (NASW) Code of Ethics explicitly mandates 
that professional practice include empirically based 
knowledge, the evaluation of programs and interven-
tions, and that social workers "critically examine and 
keep current with emerging knowledge relevant to social 
work and fully use evaluation and research evidence in 
their professional practice" (NASW, 1996, p. 4) Thus, in 
our attempt to shape and mold professional practice, the-
ories of causation, prevention, and intervention are ex-
pected to be empirically tested and verified, or, at the very 
least, lend themselves to empirical verification. 
With this in mind, it seems important to ask "What 
is the actual basis of our current professional knowl-
edge?" This is not an insignificant question because, un-
like other helping professions, social workers are expect-
ed to be experts on not only the biological, psychological, 
social, cultural, economic, and political aspects of human 
behavior, but experts on assessment, prevention, and in-
tervention at all levels of social systems as well. It is this 
very complexity, however, and the mandate that social 
workers examine both the person and the environment, 
that contributes to the unique mission of social work 
practice. However, according to Kilty and Meenaghan 
(1995), the recent focus on empirical verification has, in 
part, contributed to an incomplete focus on better indi-
vidual and family outcomes rather than an understand-
ing of the larger issues and societal structures that con-
tribute to risk and maintain social and economic in-
equality. Citing Abramovitz's (1983) concern about the 
narrowness of our conceptual frameworks, they propose 
that the selected use of scientifically based methods has 
unwittingly obscured the full range of value choices and 
research that the profession might pursue in its study of 
people and environments. 
There have been numerous debates in the profes-
sional literature about the nature of requisite knowledge 
for the profession (see, for example, Atherton, 1 9 9 3 ; Fis-
cher, 1 9 8 1 ; Franklin, 1995; Fraser et a l ; 1 9 9 1 ; Gibson & 
Nurius, 1 9 9 2 ; Goldstein, 1992; Harrison, Hudson & 
Thyer, 1 9 9 2 ; Hartman, 1990 ; 1992 ; Heineman, 1 9 8 1 ; 
Herr, 1 9 9 5 ; Hudson, 1982; Imre, 1984 ; Kirk, 1996 ; 
Klein & Bloom, 1995; Kondrat, 1995 ; Lindsey & Kirk, 
1 9 9 2 ; Minahan & Pincus, 1977; Reid, 1 9 9 4 ; Rein & 
White, 1 9 8 1 ; Rodwell, 1987; Sheldon, 1 9 7 8 ; Staller & 
Kirk, 1 9 9 8 ; Tucker, 1996; Weick, 1987 ; Witkin, 1991 ; 
1 9 9 2 ) . To date, apart from the general mandates of cur-
ricular policies set by the Council on Social Work Educa-
tion, there is little consensus about essential knowledge 
for professional practice. In addition to the traditional 
split between micro and macro practice knowledge and 
skills, the debate tends to be heavily polarized into two 
competing camps — those who argue for the primacy of 
scientific and empirically based knowledge vs. those who 
believe in the art of social work gained from practice wis-
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dom, the value of the helping relationship, and subjective 
insights gained from client self-reports and case studies. 
A more recent development in this debate is the polemic 
schism between scientific knowledge and construction-
ist/constructivist knowledge. 
At the extremes of these positions, there is little, if 
any, room for common ground. A more moderate posi-
tion accepts and advocates for a combination of both. Al-
though reasonable and, in fact, somewhat seductive at 
face value, this middle stance generally ignores the ideo-
logical biases inherent in both extremes and often fails to 
address the consequences of undisciplined eclecticism in 
which all perspectives are equally valued and uncritically 
embraced. We are not suggesting that one must choose 
between camps but, rather, that such choices must be 
made mindfully and with a full appreciation of the philo-
sophical and ideological differences that underlie these 
disparate positions about the nature of knowledge and 
the essential knowledge for practice. 
Social work is, by its very nature, a value-based pro-
fession. Although values and knowledge are seen as being 
separate but interactive components of professional deci-
sions and action (see Bartlett, 1970 ; Rosenthal, 1992 ) , 
there is a tendency to overlook the fact that values and 
ideological positions are inherent in all theory and 
knowledge. When theory and knowledge are presented 
as "objective" truths that can be empirically demonstrat-
ed and objectively verified through supposedly impartial 
scientific methods, it becomes all too easy to bypass the 
philosophical and ideological underpinnings of what we 
know. As Kilty and Meenaghan (1995) have pointed out, 
the convergence of professionalism and scientific inquiry 
in social work has led us to lose sight of critical questions 
about the use of scientific methodologies, the political 
contexts in which they occur, the goals that we seek, and 
the related practical implications for social work prac-
tice. Despite the classic and contemporary debates in the 
social science literature, we contend that neither theory, 
knowledge, nor scientific inquiry are totally value free, 
and the conceptual differentiation between knowledge 
and values easily can lead to a misconception about the 
nature of theoretical knowledge, which we discuss below. 
In the field of social work, and in the social sciences 
in general, much of our knowledge about human behav-
ior and human existence is speculative in nature. All too 
often, theories are misrepresented as " fac ts" and are seen 
as universal mandates for normative and expected behav-
ior, be it at the individual, group, organizational, commu-
nity, or societal level. As a beginning step in understand-
ing our knowledge base, we believe it is important to 
critically examine the nature of theories in order to eval-
uate both the strengths and the inherent limitations of our 
knowledge about people and their environments. 
The Nature of Theories 
Theories are an important part of our knowledge 
base because they assist in our attempts to understand 
various aspects of human behavior as well as our inter-
actions with our clients. Theories, however, not only pro-
vide us with a framework to help us organize our obser-
vations for understanding, but are also used scientifically 
for the purposes of explanation and prediction (Dubin, 
1969) . Theories do not simply emerge on their own (al-
though some are derived from a flash of insight), but are 
constructed through systematic cognitive and experien-
tial processes of inductive and deductive reasoning and 
through the interplay of empirical and theoretical struc-
tures. Empirical structures are those that are experienced 
with our senses, in our environment, while theoretical 
structures are those that we "construct in our mind's eye 
to model the empirical system" [emphasis added] 
(Dubin, 1969 , p. 9 ) . Thus, theories are based on cogni-
tive abstractions that develop over time and are both a 
description and generalization from our experiences. 
Through the repeated processes of observation and 
abstraction, theories are formulated in such a way that 
they ideally lead to the eventual generation of hypotheses 
and scientific studies that will confirm (or falsify) these 
abstractions. The scientific confirmation of a theory is a 
necessary step if the theory is to become accepted as fac-
tual knowledge. This is especially important because the-
ories not only prescribe ideals for human functioning but 
also offer guidelines for practice. 
The Social Construction of Theories 
Theories not only arise from the cognitive and expe-
riential processes of individuals described above, but 
from social processes as well. As we have noted else-
where (Robbins, Chatterjee, & Canda, 1998) , all knowl-
edge — including theoretical knowledge — is developed 
within a specific social, cultural, and historical context. 
These contexts, in turn, have a profound influence on the 
content of theory. 
In The Social Construction of Reality, Berger and 
Luckmann (1966) proposed that all knowledge is social-
ly constructed, including our knowledge of what is 
"real . " Because people are born into a society and culture 
with existing norms and predefined patterns of conduct, 
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definitions of what is "real," are socially transmitted 
from one generation to the next and are further rein-
forced by social sanctions. These existing group defini-
tions are learned and internalized through the process of 
socialization, and this knowledge becomes part of one's 
worldview and ideology. People rarely, if ever, stop to 
question their worldview and, unless challenged, they 
take it more or less for granted that the way in which 
they see the world is the same for everyone (Berger &C 
Luckmann, 1966; Robbins et a l , 1998) . 
Not surprisingly, theorists often operate under these 
very same assumptions. As a consequence, they bring the 
biases of their own gender, class, culture, and sexual ori-
entation, for example, into their work. Theories, there-
fore, are often extensions of the theorists themselves be-
cause their concerns, values, and overall worldview are 
often reflected in the theories that they construct. This is 
not unusual, but it becomes problematic when a theory is 
applied universally and thought to be representative of 
the broader human experience, in general. It is even more 
problematic when it sets standards or ideals for develop-
ment and behavior that are not, in fact, universal. 
Ideology, Scientific Theory, 
and Social Work Practice 
Due to the fact that social work emphasizes practice 
that is based on scientific theories of human behavior, 
causation, prevention, and intervention, we might incor-
rectly believe that ideology has no place in theory con-
struction or in our professional knowledge base. Despite 
the veil of scientific objectivity, theories are not free from 
the influence of ideology. They are inherently ideological 
in nature because they cannot be "free of material inter-
ests and uncompromised by moral and cultural commit-
ments" (Brown & Martin, 1 9 9 1 , p. 11). As Kilty and 
Meenaghan (1995, p. 452) note, science, itself, is always 
political and value laden and scientific methodology is 
"always contaminated by the political and economic 
context." In a similar vein, Campbell (1981, p. 22) has 
proposed that: 
. . . theories are ideological in that even the most 
neutral-looking factual claims about social phe-
nomena can be taken up and used in the com-
petition between social groups for positions of 
power, wealth, and influence . . . 
It should not be surprising, then, to find that the under-
lying assumptions of any given theory can be associated 
with different political positions and are often used to 
support or oppose specific interventions and policies that 
affect our clients. 
In addition, it is important to recognize that theories 
can become self-fulfilling or self-refuting based on our 
own attitudes and beliefs. For example, the beliefs that 
we hold about ourselves, our clients, our relationships, 
our families, our society, and our economic and political 
systems can influence our actions which, in turn, may 
serve to validate (or refute) a certain theoretical perspec-
tive (Campbell, 1981) . As we have noted elsewhere (Rob-
bins et al., 1998 ) , a person who strongly believes, for ex-
ample, that early childhood experiences are at the root of 
problems in adulthood will tend to look for previously 
undiscovered traumatic experiences in the family of ori-
gin. This will likely intensify, create, or bring to the sur-
face unpleasant memories that might have been less pro-
nounced if the source of the problem was attributed to 
present day stressors. Similarly, a belief in and adherence 
to theories that promote individuation as a normative de-
velopmental goal will lead people to seek independence 
rather than interdependence; in doing so, this will vali-
date one developmental path while refuting the other. 
According to Campbell (1981 , p. 2 2 ) , theories are 
"in the complicated position of being a part of the reali-
ty they purport to analyze." This embedded relationship, 
coupled with the way in which theories are used to ad-
vocate for specific interventions and policies, make it es-
pecially important for us to understand both the practi-
cal and political implications of a given theory. In order 
to gain this understanding, we must be particularly 
aware of the ideological underpinnings inherent in our 
theories and knowledge so that they can be subjected to 
thoughtful and critical analysis. The literature is replete 
with debates about value-free social science; it is our firm 
position that value-free social science and, by extension, 
a value-free knowledge base, is simply not possible. 
Ideology is present not only in our theoretical 
knowledge base but in all professional social work set-
tings as well. Flowchart 1 demonstrates the way in which 
ideology directly influences the helping situation and in-
directly influences both scientific theory and the related 
intervention strategies that are used in practice. 
There are at least two ways to define a helping situ-
ation, as illustrated in Flowchart 1: (1) a professional def-
inition, which emerges from the application of scientific 
theory, but under the influence of existing ideologies that 
are often unknown; and (2) a popular definition, which 
develops from existing ideologies (or normative knowl-
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edge) of society and, most typically, a rather inadequate 
knowledge of scientific theory. Due to the fact that there 
are many types of ideologies and scientific theories, this 
leads to numerous professional definitions of the helping 
situation (variations of the pathway to the left) as well as 
many popular definitions (variations of the pathway to 
the right). However, as indicated by the arrows between 
the two, these are not totally independent, and may, at 
times, influence each other directly or indirectly (Robbins 
et al. 1998) . 
Ideological Factors in the Historical 
and Professional Context of Practice 
and Our Choice of Theories 
As seen in Flowchart 1, the definitions and norms 
that govern professional practice already exist when a cli-
ent seeks (or is required to seek) assistance and are based 
on a preexisting definition of the situation (see Chatter-
jee, 1 9 8 5 , 1 9 9 0 ; Chatterjee & Bailey, 1993 ; Chatterjee & 
Flowchart 1. The Interplay Between Scientific Theory and Ideology. 
History 
Scientific Theory 
of Causation 
Explanation: 'what is' 
and 'why it is the way it is' 
(2) 
(1) 
Ideology 
(Normative Knowledge) 
Theory of prevention 
and intervention 
(Technology) 
The definition 
of the helping 
situation 
(professional 
prescription: 
'what can be 
done') 
The definition 
of the helping 
situation 
(popular 
prescription: 
'what ought to 
be done') 
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Hilbert, 1986) . Ideology is embedded in the helping situ-
ation itself as well as in its historical and organizational 
contexts; it defines and sustains not only the context of 
helping, but also the interactions between the persons in-
volved. For example, it defines the role and "appropri-
ate" behavior of the client, the role and "appropriate" 
professional behavior of the social worker, their respec-
tive statuses, and whether, how, and how much the social 
worker should be paid. 
Theories, therefore, are often 
extensions of the theorists themselves 
because their concerns, values, 
and overall worldview are often reflected 
in the theories that they construct. 
Historically, in the quest for professional status, so-
cial work's relatively early adoption of psychoanalytic 
and psychodynamic theory led to a narrow individual 
and intrapsychic view of people and ushered in a medical 
model of practice that represented a sharp departure 
from the socioeconomic base of practice that was appar-
ent in the earlier Settlement House Movement (Trattner, 
1986, p. 245) . Although our professional theory base has 
now been expanded to include systems theory and an 
ecological perspective, psychological perspectives on the 
life span continue to dominate much of our social work 
knowledge about human behavior. Despite the systemic 
and ecological focus on client problems and their poten-
tial for growth rather than on illness and pathology, the 
current use of systems-based theories has largely retained 
a micro and meso level focus for direct practice rather 
than a broader focus for social action (Robbins et al., 
1998). In both our early and ongoing efforts to achieve 
increased professionalization we have selected some the-
ories and omitted others — some by accident and others 
by design. Given our historical struggle for social ap-
proval, professional status, and our recent emphasis on 
empirical verification, it is not surprising that the theories 
that we have adopted and defined as central to our 
knowledge base tend to be both psychologically based 
and politically conservative (Abramovitz, 1 9 8 3 ; Kilty &c 
Meenaghan, 1995; Robbins et al., 1998) . 
Where Do We Go From Here? 
Expanding Our Theory Base for 
Contemporary and Future Practice 
As we move forward into the next millennium, we 
are faced with critical value choices about essential 
knowledge for practice. If practice is to adequately reflect 
our mission for social justice and our holistic concern for 
both the person and the environment, we believe that our 
knowledge must be expanded to include a broad multi-
disciplinary theory base that will provide a more com-
prehensive view of the human condition and the lives of 
our clients. Due to the complexity of human behavior 
and human experience, it is critical that our theory base 
encompass a broad range of theories and knowledge 
from the human and social sciences. We concur with 
Kilty and Meenaghan (1995, p. 452) that it is important 
to recognize the political and value laden nature o f sci-
ence, while at the same time: 
. . . identifying values and value options; defin-
ing problems and conditions, especially the no-
tions of chance and risk, as they relate to differ-
ent groups in society; selecting goals that focus 
on groups and risks as well as goals that focus 
on individuals and need; and designing and eval-
uating interventions that are preventive as well 
as restorative to groups, recognizing that such 
interventions are tied to bigger issues and struc-
tures in society. 
In defining and choosing a theory base that will pro-
vide this type of holistic perspective, we believe that it is 
important for us to now look both outward and inward. 
First, in looking outward, we believe that it is par-
ticularly relevant for social work to draw on the assump-
tions of critical theory to analyze the social, ideological, 
and economic structures of society and their impact on 
individual problems. Critical theory posits that, " M o s t 
individual problems are in fact social problems, caused 
by an inequitable social structure" (Findlay, 1978 , p. 5 5 ) . 
Due to the politically conservative theory base that has 
predominated social work, the addition of this perspec-
tive is long overdue. In order to demystify ideologically 
based issues of power and truth, Witkin and Gottschalk 
(1988 , p. 218) have noted that theory for practice must 
include "a reflexive element concerning its historical, cul-
tural, and political/economic significance." This is par-
ticularly important because these macro level concerns 
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have significant impact on our clients' lives and the way 
in which we view our clients. Fisher and Karger (1997) 
have argued that macro contextualization be put at the 
base of social work practice. With the exception of fem-
inist and constructionist thought, these concerns have 
been seriously minimized or ignored in our predominant-
ly psychological and systemic theories. 
Next, in looking inward, social workers must become 
better educated in two distinct areas that have been large-
ly neglected in our theory base; 1) biology and genetics; 
and 2) Western and non-Western concepts of spirituality. 
It is critical that our knowledge include the most contem-
porary and well-replicated research about the relative in-
fluence of genetics, biological, and neurobiological factors 
in behavior. Although there is now a tendency in the fields 
of psychiatry and medicine to be reductionistic and 
overemphasize the role of neurobiology in the creation of 
psychological disorders (see Valenstein, 1998) , we cannot 
ignore the fact that human behavior expresses the com-
plex interactions of biology and environment. 
Further, due to the numerous, diverse, and conflict-
ing religious and non-religion spiritual perspectives that 
shape our lives and the lives of our clients, our social 
work settings, and social institutions, it is imperative that 
we also gain a better and broader understanding of spir-
ituality and religion. Because spirituality and religion are 
pervasive in many of our clients' lives as well as in many 
of our social work settings, it is essential that we gain 
substantial knowledge in this area and become familiar 
with both theories and philosophical thought that ad-
dress these issues (see Canda, 1988; 1989; 1 9 9 1 ; 1996; 
1997) . Very significantly, spirituality can also motivate 
action toward social justice, a guiding value in social 
work practice. 
Finally, as we expand our theory base and define es-
sential knowledge for practice, we believe that it is im-
portant to add an element that is often absent in most so-
cial work literature — an analysis of theory that is based 
on critical thinking. As we have noted elsewhere (Robbins 
et al., 1998) , the inherently ideological nature of theories 
makes it particularly important for us to examine theories 
systematically through the use of rigorous intellectual 
analysis, criticism, and evaluation. Most commonly, theo-
ries are analyzed simplistically and uncritically in relation 
to their strengths and weaknesses, which are often pre-
sented as having equal merit. We strongly believe that crit-
ical thinking is a necessary component of social work, and 
one which, according Gibbs and Gambrill (1996) , is often 
missing in professional practice. Critical thought goes be-
yond a simple appraisal of the claims and arguments that 
are embodied in a theory and involves the use of specific 
standards in evaluating evidence combined with a fair and 
thorough critique of alternative views. Very importantly, 
critical analysis should also aid us in recognizing the long-
standing problems of determinism and reductionism that 
are inherent in all theories. 
The Challenge of Critical Analysis 
of Theory: Comparing Apples 
and Oranges 
Given the broad theoretical base that is necessary to 
understand the complexity of our clients' lives and cir-
cumstances, one of the important challenges that we face 
is delineating specific criteria for critical analysis of theo-
ry that will allow us to compare and evaluate, for exam-
ple, theories from the biological, psychological, anthro-
pological, social, economic, and political sciences. At its 
best, a given theory may describe some of the distinct 
threads of the fabric of our clients' lives and experiences, 
but will never fully capture a holistic view of the person 
or the fabric itself. Thus, some theories address biologi-
cal and psychological factors, but ignore the political and 
economic context. Likewise, other theories focus solely 
on political, historical, and economic factors and exclude 
psychological ones. Some theories may even include mul-
tiple factors but emphasize one over the others. Compar-
ing and evaluating such disparate theories may appear 
similar to comparing apples and oranges because the ob-
vious differences can easily obscure the fact that they can, 
in fact, be compared systematically. However, before de-
lineating the criteria that we believe should be used in the 
evaluation of theory, we first describe three approaches 
that should be avoided. 
Approaches to Avoid in 
Choosing a Theory Base 
In order to forge the necessary linkages between the-
ory and practice, it is crucial to examine different ap-
proaches that are sometimes used in selecting and apply-
ing theories for practice. We caution against three 
approaches that we have seen promoted in social work: 
rejecting theory; theoretical dogmatism; and undisci-
plined eclecticism (Robbins et al., 1998) . 
Some may believe that theory is useless or irrelevant 
and they summarily reject the use of theory and focus, in-
stead, on specific practice methods and interventions in 
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their work with clients. We believe that this is unsound 
because social work practice, practice methods, and in-
terventions are informed by values, ideology, and as-
sumptions about human nature that are often theoreti-
cally based. When this is ignored, it increases the risk of 
imposing an unwitting or hidden agenda on clients. 
A second approach to avoid is theoretical dogma-
tism. This occurs when practitioners believe a particular 
theory to be universally true, and they apply their theory 
of choice to all clients and client situations. Such theoret-
ical loyalty excludes the use of other theories that might 
be more relevant to an individual client's needs and cir-
cumstances. Thus, we have loyal neo-Freudians, behav-
iorists, Jungians, feminists, constructionists, ego psychol-
ogists, systems theorists, conflict theorists, etc. 
Dogmatism of this sort obscures the limitations and con-
straints that are inherent in theories due to their social 
construction, and we lose sight of the fact that theories 
are simplifications of reality. Theoretical dogmatism re-
duces all clients and situations into whatever terms are 
comfortable to the practitioner. This is particularly dan-
gerous because it submerges the reality of the client in the 
theoretical assumptions of the practitioner. 
Theories assist in our attempts to understand 
various aspects of human behavior 
as well as our interactions with our clients. 
A third approach we caution against is undisciplined 
eclecticism. Although social workers may recognize the 
importance of theory, they may not have achieved an ad-
equate grasp of any particular theory. As a result, they 
may mix and match bits and pieces from different theo-
ries and practice approaches that they have learned. 
However, combining theories in this way is every bit as 
controlling as dogmatism; it is simply less disciplined and 
poorly informed. 
The approach that we propose and delineate below 
is based on critical analysis and reflection and is sub-
stantially different from ignoring theory, dogmatically 
adhering to a theory, or choosing a theory in an undisci-
plined fashion. A critically reflective approach involves 
cultivating clear awareness about one's own values, 
goals, practice commitments, strengths, and limitations. 
It also involves developing a thorough knowledge of a 
wide range of theories that deal with the person and the 
environment in a holistic manner. It requires making an 
informed and reflective evaluation about each theory as 
well as an examination of the theory's fit with social 
work values. Finally, it requires careful professional judg-
ment about the relevance of a given theory to a particu-
lar situation in collaboration with the client. 
Criteria for Critically Evaluating 
Theory and Knowledge for Practice 
As noted above, critical thought involves a rigorous 
analysis of theory that includes use of specific standards 
and criteria, the evaluation of existing evidence, and fair 
consideration and critique of alternative views. With this 
in mind, we propose three specific criteria for theory 
evaluation that we believe to be most relevant for social 
work practice. 
Criterion 1 : Theories for social work practice should 
be consistent with social work values and ethics. Due to 
the fact that social work practice is governed by a pro-
fessional Code of Ethics that is unique to social work, 
one essential criterion for theory selection is that the the-
ories that we use in practice should both reflect and be 
consistent with the basic tenets of our social work values. 
Social work has embodied a set of values and ethics that 
are expressed not only in our Code of Ethics, but in the 
design of our professional curriculum as well. These val-
ues include, but are not limited to, respect for the inher-
ent dignity and worth of the person; helping people 
achieve optimal health and well-being; the importance of 
client self-determination; promoting respect for human 
diversity; challenging social injustice; and working to-
ward the goal of empowerment for individuals and 
groups. We discuss this at great length and place our pri-
mary focus on this criterion because it is most central to 
our professional identification as social workers and to 
the unique mission of the profession. 
While psychological life span theory has placed em-
phasis on psychological and physical well-being and sys-
temic/ecological theory has made us more aware of the 
issue of "goodness-of fit" between people and their envi-
ronments, our primary theories remain focused on ex-
tremely narrow social and physical dimensions of envi-
ronment. In order to more fully address the insidious 
forms of social injustice that are created and supported 
by oppression and discrimination, it is particularly im-
portant for us to expand this focus to explicitly include 
the notion of economic well-being as well as an under-
standing of the role of our political system in initiating 
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and maintaining oppression and injustice. Additionally, 
as noted above, a truly holistic view of people must also 
address issues of biology, genetics, and spirituality as 
well, areas that have recently gained increasing accep-
tance, but have not yet been systematically incorporated 
into our theory base. 
Although client self-determination has long been a 
central value in social work (see Ewalt & Mokuau, 1995; 
Freedberg, 1989 ; Haynes & Holmes, 1994; Rothman, 
Smith, Nakashima, Paterson & Mustin, 1996; Perlman, 
1965 ; Biestek, 1978 ; Weick & Pope, 1988), this has not 
always been reflected in our theory base. It is critical that 
we move away from an over-reliance on theories that are 
inherently reductionistic, deterministic, and pathology-
based. When clients are seen primarily as causal products 
of faulty biology, neurotransmission, early childhood in-
fluences, or their socio-cultural environments, for exam-
ple, we rob them of self-determination and free will and 
ultimately ignore or minimize our clients' potential to 
grow and change. 
Further, respect for the inherent dignity and worth of 
people and respect for human diversity are central to our 
value base and an important area for theory analysis. 
Most theories claim to be universal, despite the fact that 
few can live up to this claim. Because most theorists write 
from their personal and cultural frame of reference, at-
tempts to generalize are often problematic, to say the 
least. Given that the vast majority of our theories have 
been classically authored by white, middle- to 
upper-class, Western European and American men (many 
of whom are now dead), it is not surprising to find bias-
es of race, gender, culture, religion, sexual orientation, 
and social class inherent in much of our theory base. Al-
though there have been corrective tendencies in recent 
years (many of which contain their own — albeit differ-
ent — biases), social work theory continues to be domi-
nated by these biased conceptions of human behavior 
and human experience (Robbins, et al., 1998) . 
At issue here is not who authors a given theory, but 
rather, to whom the theory is applied — and the conse-
quences of that application. People are most often por-
trayed as deficient when they do not fit a theory's con-
structs (Gilligan, 1 9 8 2 ; Howard and Scott, 1 9 8 1 ; 
Robbins, 1984) . Because it is rare that we question the va-
lidity of a well-accepted theory, we come to question the 
validity and worth of the person instead. This is antithet-
ical to the values of respecting the inherent value and 
worth of the person and respecting diversity. The ideolog-
ical nature of theory often creates serious constraints on 
our ability to appreciate differences that do not conform 
to our mainstream social norms (Robbins et al., 1998) . 
Social work has a specific commitment to challenge 
social injustice and to understand and promote empow-
erment and strength at both personal and political levels 
(Gutierrez & Ortega, 1991; Hartman, 1993; Lee, 1 9 9 4 ; 
Saleebey, 1992; Simon, 1994; Weick & Saleebey, 1 9 9 5 ) . 
As a proactive response to personal and societal forces 
that oppress and restrict human potential and well-being, 
empowerment practice is aimed at assisting people who 
experience systematic forms of discrimination, harass-
ment, and oppression. It becomes imperative, then, to ex-
amine the implications of theories for political con-
sciousness raising, enhancing self-efficacy, and 
supporting collective action. 
A focus on empowerment is strongly supported by the 
strengths perspective, a practical and philosophical stance 
that emphasizes the human capacity for resiliency, 
courage, strength in the face of adversity, ingenuity in ac-
cessing and creating resources, and the right of individuals 
to form their own aspirations and definitions of their situ-
ations (Rapp & Wintersteen, 1989; Saleebey, 1992 , 1996 ; 
Weick, Rapp, Sullivan, &c Kisthardt, 1989). Our cardinal 
values of respecting people's inherent dignity and worth 
and the importance of client self-determination are clearly 
embodied in this approach. Although the strengths per-
spective has been accused of "reframing misery," ignoring 
reality, and taking a Pollyannaish approach that ignores 
dangerous and destructive client behaviors, Saleebey 
(1996) has countered these criticisms by directly address-
ing the misconceptions inherent in these arguments. 
Perhaps most importantly, the strengths perspective 
rejects models of pathology that have been widely used in 
social work and in the social sciences to describe op-
pressed groups. Theories that pathologize oppressed 
populations place a primary focus on deficit, illness, and 
problems and portray our clients as inherently deficient 
and problematic. In contrast, theories that are consistent 
with the strengths perspective portray people as being 
most likely to grow and develop when their strengths, 
rather than their problems, are recognized and support-
ed. Perhaps most central to our professional values, the 
strengths perspective offers a basis from which helpers 
"become agents" of the focus group or individual and 
from which the group or individual is treated with digni-
ty and respect and is regarded as having special "exper-
tise" (Weick and Saleebey, 1995, p. 148) . Importantly, 
the empowerment and strengths perspectives not only 
caution us to beware of theories that pathologize or 
blame the victim, but also challenge us to cull the insights 
from theories that are conducive to self-actualization and 
381 
F A M I L I E S IN S O C I E T Y • Volume 80, Number 4 
social justice (Robbins et a l , 1998) . 
Thus, in evaluating a theory's consistency with social 
work values, it is important that we pay specific attention 
to the way in which a theory addresses — or fails to ad-
dress — issues related to client dignity and worth, self-de-
termination, helping clients achieve optimal health and 
well-being, respecting diversity, strengths and resiliency, 
challenging social injustice, and working toward empow-
erment. We propose that theories that address and em-
brace these concepts have more utility for social work 
practice than those that do not. 
Criterion 2: Theories for social work practice should 
be subjected to scientific scrutiny, methodologically 
sound research, and be verifiable. Despite the fact the 
numerous methodological assumptions and issues under-
lie every theory, it is extremely important to know the 
degree to which a given theory has received empirical 
validation. Theories, by their very nature, are part of a 
scientific venture and thus, are more than mere opinions, 
ideology and politics notwithstanding. According to 
Cohen (1989, p. 22) , the evaluation of theories "requires 
evidence, and the evaluation of evidence demands an 
evaluation of the methods by which the evidence was ob-
tained." A critical analysis of theory, then, must also 
include both an empirical evaluation of the central con-
cepts as well as an evaluation of the adequacy of the 
methods used. 
We are not, however, promoting a narrow definition 
of research. Empirical evidence can be derived from di-
rect experience gained through rigorous and replicated 
systematic inquiry that includes qualitative, quantitative, 
historical, and phenomenological research. It is impor-
tant to recognize that theories are not only evaluated by 
research, but also offer implicit suggestions for the spe-
cific types of research that are most useful for the phe-
nomena under consideration. 
Thus, a determination of whether a theory's central 
concepts and main hypotheses are scientifically well 
grounded makes it necessary to also evaluate the ade-
quacy of the proposed methods. In addition, we must 
evaluate the degree to which the theory is actually sup-
ported by evidence. If science is to inform practice, as 
called for by our Code of Ethics, it is critical to be able to 
distinguish between what a theorist has claimed in con-
trast to what has actually been empirically demonstrated 
(Robbins, 1995a; Robbins et al., 1998) . 
Criterion 3: Theories for social work practice should 
do no harm. Although this criterion has not been explic-
itly addressed in the social work literature, it is easily de-
rived from the Code of Ethics and basic philosophical po-
sitions that undergird the profession. (Check & 
Asquith,1985; NASW, 1986) . The Code of Ethics man-
dates that social workers act with integrity, behave in a 
trustworthy manner, be competent in their areas of prac-
tice, and continually increase their own professional 
knowledge and skills (NASW, 1996) . These ethical man-
dates, combined with the requirement that practice be 
based on empirically validated knowledge, place a special 
obligation on social workers to not harm the people that 
they serve. 
At face value, this might appear to be a superfluous 
criterion, given the high value placed on integrity, trust-
worthiness, and competence. However, given the ideolog-
ical biases inherent in all theory and the serious problems 
that can result from theoretical dogmatism and undisci-
plined eclecticism, we believe that the mandate to "do no 
harm" is a necessary additional criterion for both profes-
sional practice and the evaluation of theory for practice. 
A practitioner's dogmatic adherence to unproven theories 
and dubious practice techniques, which are often based 
on personal or political ideology, can indeed cause serious 
and sometimes irreparable harm to clients (see Parr, 1996 ; 
Pendergrast, 1 9 9 6 ; Robbins, 1995a, 1995b; 1997; Stocks, 
1998) . Unfortunately, existing ethical principles for prac-
tice do not address this issue with sufficient clarity. 
The mandate to "do no harm" has long been a guid-
ing principle in medicine, embodied in the Hippocratic 
Oath (Von Staden, 1996); we propose that it become an 
explicit obligation for professional social work practice 
and a criterion for theory evaluation as well. 
Conclusion 
As we begin to critically analyze the theories for 
practice, it is important to be aware of the ideological bi-
ases that result from the social construction of theory. 
We must also develop a profound understanding of the 
way in which theories can come to define "reality" and 
the impact this has on those who may not share in this 
reality. It is equally important for us to realize that the 
biases that may be the most difficult for us to detect are 
those related to our taken-for-granted cultural norms. It 
is our firm position that we must become aware of these 
biases if we are to serve our clients in ways that can lead 
to empowerment. 
To repeat, our professional knowledge and theories 
have been based in recent times on a rather narrow con-
ception of person and environment. Our choice of theo-
ries, disciplinary loyalties, as well as increased specializa-
tion, have led to a fragmented and incomplete view of the 
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human condition, human behavior, and human experi-
ence. This has been further exacerbated in social work by 
our professional "split" into separate areas of clinical 
and community practice, each with its own theory base. 
We believe, however, that contemporary developments in 
society and in theory construction are now forcing us to 
see connections that were readily apparent to social work 
pioneers such as Jane Addams, Lillian Wald, Bertha 
Reynolds, and the many others involved in the early de-
velopment of social work. As we step into the twenty-
first century, social work is in a unique position to renew 
its historical commitment to a holistic view of both peo-
ple and their environments (Robbins et al. 1998) . 
We face numerous challenges, however, in our at-
tempt to achieve such a holistic view. First, we must rec-
ognize the impact and importance of rapid technological 
and social change on our social institutions, organiza-
tional structures, family forms, and individual values, be-
liefs, and behaviors. Because all theory is developed with-
in a specific historical context, we must also begin to 
critically examine the relevancy of any theory that does 
not adequately account for life in contemporary society. 
Further, we must be able and willing to openly question 
some of our deeply held assumptions about the nature of 
self, family, community, and society. And finally, we must 
be open to adopting new theories that more accurately 
reflect the changing economic, cultural, and psychologi-
cal landscape of contemporary life as well as those that 
are consistent with our professional value base. 
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